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Abstract
Usual microeconometric studies of the French fertility su¤er from the lack of data on
religion. Indeed, the French laws make it very di¢ cult to collect data on the individuals
religious a¢ liation. However, recent studies tend to validate the important role played by
culture and especially religion in fertility behaviors. This paper proposes a microeconometric
investigation of the French fertility where religion is taken into account. As a result, to
be Catholic has no signicant e¤ect on fertility and considering oneself as a believer does
also not matter. However, to be a practicer, whatever the measure that is chosen, has
always a positive and signicant impact on expected fertility. This paper also validates usual
predictions of family economics. The income of male has a positive impact on the female
fertility while the female income has a negative impact on womens fertility. Moreover, the
school attainment of women has a negative impact on their expected number of children.
Finally, in line with recent studies of Adserá [2006] ; Fernandez & Fogli [2007], Braenas-
Garza & Neuman [2006], etc., the present paper reconciles the beckerian analysis of fertility
behaviors and the idea that non economical factors, namely culture, are hugely important
in fertility choices.
JEL Codes: J11, J13, Z12
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1 Introduction
Usual microeconometric studies of the French fertility su¤er from a lack of data on religion.
The aim of this chapter is to overcome this shortcoming by providing a microeconometric
investigation of the French fertility where, for the rst time to the best of my knowledge,
religion is taken into account. Furthermore, beyond this religious dimension, I provide
complementary proxies for culture like the transmission of family values from parents to
children.
As mentioned in the general introduction, the economic analysis of fertility behaviors
enriched with microeconomic foundations since the seminal approach of Becker et al [1960,
1973, 1976]. The Beckerian theory assumes that children are time consuming, especially
for women. It implies that higher female income results in smaller fertility rates2. The
household theory of fertility3 shows that an increase in the income of women reduces their
fertility while an increase in the male income increases the household total fertility rate
(TFR). Indeed, a higher male income reduces the opportunity cost for the woman not to
participate to the workforce4. These standard mechanisms of endogenous fertility models
have largely been evidenced by empirical studies without including cultural variables5. This
absence of cultural determinants was essentially due to the lack of datasets allowing to clearly
identify and measure cultural variables.
Thanks to the recent development of rich datasets including both economic and cultural
variables, economists are now able to properly measure the impact of culture on fertility6.
Doing so, they can test the validity of the usual Beckerian conclusions in a framework where
culture matters. In the present chapter, I provide a contribution to this recent literature.
controlling for usual economic variables like the respondents incomes and education, I in-
vestigate cultural determinants of individual fertility on a French sample.
Religion is often chosen by the literature to identify and measure culture7. Guiso et
2Becker & Tomes [1976] argue that an increase in the parental income incite parents to have less children
better educated because the income elasticity of demand for quality is higher than the income elasticity of
demand for quantity.
3See, for instance, Browning et al [2006] for a review of this literature.
4See, for instance, Galor & Weil [1996] and Browning et al [2006].
5See Schultz [2008] and Hotz et al [1993] for a review of this literature.
6See Guiso et al [2006] for a review of this literature.
7Fernandez and Fogli [2007] show, without using religious variables, that culture is important to the
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al [2006] argue that "religious practices, even when they respond to economic conditions,
are modied over time only at centuries or even millennium frequency. In this spirit, we
restrict our attention (...) to those cultural aspects like religion and ethnic background that
can largely be treated as invariant over an individuals lifetime"8.
French laws make it very di¢ cult to collect data on the individuals religious a¢ liation. If
religion had no impact on fertility behaviors, this specicity would not weaken the analysis
of individual fertility behaviors in France. In line with the recent literature, this chapter
shows that this is not actually the case.
Several studies directly deal with the religious dimension of culture. The investigation of
the religionsrole in fertility behaviors essentially tries to answer two questions: "Are there
any di¤erences in fertility behaviors between religions?" and "Does religiousness inuence
fertility?" Few evidence support the existence of time persistent di¤erences in fertility rates
between the main monotheistic religions (see Braenas-Garza & Neuman [2006]).
Religiosity, however, appears to be a signicant determinant of fertility. Neuman &
Ziderman [1986] nd that, among Jews, religiousness (measured by time devoted to reli-
gious activities) strongly and signicantly increases fertility. Heineck [2006] studies the link
between religion and fertility in Austria. He nds that women who are "strong Catholic
believers" are expected to have larger families than woman without any religious belief.
Hacker [1999] shows that the degree of Christian conservatism is a good proxy for reli-
gious sentiment for American-born white women in the nineteenth century. Conservatism
is measured by a dummy variable indicating whether individuals belong to specic religious
groups such as Congregationalists, Universalists, Lutherans or Catholics. He nds that this
proxy has a signicant e¤ect on womens fertility: more conservatism implies a higher total
understanding of female work and fertility decisions. They observe the economic behavior of immigrants in
the United States during the second half of the twentieth century. They consider the expected female labor
force participation and their total fertility rate, for the year 1950 in the immigrants country of origin, as a
good proxy for culture. It reects their countrys cultural attitude toward womens labor and fertility. They
nd that the cultural proxy is an economically and statistically signicant variable to explain womens labor
force participation and their total fertility rate. This epidemiological method could not be applied in the
French case because informations about ethnic origin or country of origin cannot be collected.
8Birdsall [1988] argues, following Easterlin [1978] and Easterlin et al [1980], that fertility behaviors are
inuenced by social norms. She mentions that "these norms may change in response to economic factors,
but they are viewed as changing slowly enough so that for individual couples within a given society they can
be considered as exogenous to fertility"
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fertility rate.
Williams and Zimmer [1990], Adserá [2006] ; Amin et al [1997] show that the religiousness
measured by church attendance has a positive and signicant impact on fertility9.
France is a secularized country with a Catholic identity. It was the rst European country
to enter the secularization process. Furthermore, the proportion of Catholics practicers keeps
dramatically decreasing since 1945. This process quickened during the seventies. In 2001,
the proportion of French individuals who had at least one element of Catholic practice10 per
month is about 12% (Hervieu-Léger [2004]). This makes intuitive that religiousness should
have a relevant impact on individual fertility (see Adsera [2006]).
The data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Français" is the rst opportunity to measure
the impact of religion and religiousness on fertility in France. It provides precise measures
for religion like to be a Believer or not, church attendance, individuals estimation of the
importance of religion in their own life11. This data is also rich of numerous informations
about the respondents economic situation (incomes, savings, wealth, history on the labor
market, etc.), his lifestyle (health, addictions, consuming habits, etc.), his risk aversion and
his values (religion, politics, attitude toward foreigners, etc.)
Several dimensions of religion are investigated in the present chapter. As in the usual
literature, I explore the impact of the adherence to a religion, of believing (to be a religious
believer or not) and of religiousness on fertility. I nd that having been raised in a specic
religion has no e¤ect on expected fertility. Dening oneself as a religious believer has,
a priori, a positive and signicant impact on individual fertility. Nevertheless this e¤ect
loses its signicance when the degree of religiousness is introduced. This latter is nally
the only religious variable that really matters for fertility. This result is validated whether
religiousness is measured by church attendance or by the respondents subjective evaluation
9Note that Braenas-Garza & Neuman [2006] nd that, among Spanish catholics, the exposure to religious
practice during childhood has a positive impact on fertility. They also nd that current religiosity of the
respondent has no e¤ect on fertility. However, the exposure to religious practice during childhood and current
religiosity are strongly correlated.
10Either going to church, going to cathechism, confession, etc.
11Notice that, as the main purpose of this data set was not the study of fertility behaviors, some relevant
informations are missing. Particularly, the absence of information on childrens education makes it impossible
to investigate the quality quantity trade-o¤ chosen by parents. Furthermore, childrens date of birth are not
reported. It prevents the study of the impact of family policies on fertility choices and the examination of
births spacing behaviors.
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of the importance of religion in his own life. This last measure is innovative in the literature.
Culture is not investigated only through the impact of religion on fertility. Indeed, I
explore two aspects of the cultural transmission into the family: the inuence of parental
fertility on the own respondents fertility and the transmission of "Family Ties / Family
Oriented Values"12 among generations. I nd that these two channels are as important as
religious variables to explain fertility. Indeed, having been raised in a large family signi-
cantly increases the repondents expected fertility. The interpretation of this result is not
straightforward. Bisin & Verdier [2001] underline the possibility that parents transmit their
preferences to their children through a socialization process. Then, the e¤ect of the vari-
able "parental fertility" could reect some transmission of the parental taste for fertility
but also alternative transmissions from parents to children like social position and location.
Nevertheless, this variable allows to control my results for these e¤ects.
I also nd that respondents who have been raised in a family with "strong family ties"
have signicantly more children than others. Family ties are measured by replies to the
following questions: "Which of the following values do you (or would you) try to transmit to
your children?" and "Among the same set of values, which ones did your parents transmit
you?" Respondent have been allowed to choose three answers among twelve like "Indepen-
dency", "Taste for Work", "Generosity", Happiness", Honesty", "Family Values", etc. A
respondent who choose "Family Values" for one of the questions gets one, he gets two if he
chooses it for the two questions and zero otherwise13. I nd that this score variable, called
"Family Oriented values", has a positive and signicant impact on the respondents fertility.
I control my results for the respondents familial background. Obviously, never having
been married strongly decreases expected fertility. Among the conclusions of usual family
economics (see Behrman [1993]), I nd that male income has a positive impact on female
fertility whereas the female income has a negative impact. The womens education negatively
12From French "Le sens de la Famille". I will refer to Family Oriented Values during the rest of the
chapter.
13Alesina & Giuliano [2007] nd that strong family ties are associated with higher fertility with a di¤erent
method. They measure family ties with individual responses from the World Value Survey "regarding the
role of the family and the love and respect that children need to have for their parents" for over 70 countries.
They show that strong family ties implies a relatively stronger reliance to home production than to labor
market participation. It results in lower labor force participation of women and higher fertility.
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inuences fertility14 in the sense that the least educated women have more children than
others. The respondents age is the most powerful explanatory variable for the high frequency
of observations where fertility equals zero. It highlights the strong postponement of rst
births which is a common characteristic of all developed countries. Furthermore, the womans
education and the size of the city where she lives both have a signicant impact on the
decision not to have children: highly educated women from big cities are more likely to
choose not having children than other women.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of
the French fertility. Section 3 describes the data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Français".
Section 4 discusses the estimation method and presents its main results. Section 5 proposes
some robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 A Brief Overview of The French Fertility
The French fertility has been the rst to decrease in early Europe in the eighteenth century.
It started to decrease even before mortality. This feature has often been mentioned to
invalidate the traditional theory of the demographic transition which presents the decrease
of mortality as the main reason for the long run fall in fertility (Galor [2005a]). France has
also been the rst European country to enter secularization. This has favored the adoption
of modern methods of birth control and notably contraception (Lesthaeghe & Wilson [1986]
and Kirk [1996]). Lesthaeghe [1977] underlines that the proximity of the French culture was
one of the main determinant of the earlier and faster fertility decrease in Wallonia than in
Flanders.
As in all European countries, after the Second World War, fertility in France has been
relatively high until the seventies. In 1970, the total fertility rate was very close to 2,5
children per women. Since 1964, the French fertility had decreased and reached its lowest
level, in a period of peace15, at 1,66 children per women in 1993. As displayed on gure 1,
since 1994, this rate has always been increasing to reach 1,98 in 2006.
In 1994, the French family policies became more generous. Subsidies for births particu-
14This result also appears in Schultz [1999], Breierova & Duo [2004], Hoem et al [2006]. Note that less
conclusive results are nd by Kravdal [2004] and McCrary & Royer [2006].
15During the First World War, the French fertility rate reached its minimum at 1,23 in 1916.
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Figure 1: Evolution of French Total Fertility Rate since 1987 (US Census Bureau)
larly raised for families who decide to have a third child. Furthermore, strong e¤orts have
been made to provide day nurseries and to reduce the cost of child care by sitters. These
policies succeeded in allowing French women to have children without renouncing to their
career16. Brewster & Rindfus [1996] and Apps & Rees [2004] argue that such public policies
decrease the child rearing time of parents (and especially women) and in turn, incite house-
holds to have more children and women to increase their labor supply. A large literature
highlight that French public policies are one of the main determinant of the persistence of
high fertility rates in France17. For instance, Lauer & Weber [2003] and Köppen [2006] show
that French women have both more children and higher participation to the labor market
than German women. They nd that di¤erences in family friendly policies are the main
determinant of this di¤erential fertility.
Toulemon et al [2008] argue that the family policies in France have created especially
positive attitudes towards two or three child families. Such policies have largely enjoyed a
consensus among politicians and French residents. Laroque & Salanie [2005] also nd that
16Indeed, in France like in other European countries, the relationship between fertility and womens par-
ticipation to the labor market is now positive (see Ahn & Mira [2002]).
17Prioux [2007] provides an enlighting presentation of fertility evolutions in France for the last thirty years.
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nancial incentives have been e¢ cient in increasing the fertility in France.
If the current French fertility rate is below its replacement level, it is the highest among
European countries since 2002 (see gure 2). France is expected to increase its population
up to 65,7 million people in 2050 while the Germans population is expected to decrease
in the same time. If this happens, Germanys population would stay the largest in Europe
and the French population the second largest one. Due to larger fertility, ageing is expected
to be lower in France, it implies that the proportion of the French population in Europe is
expected to raise from 16 to 17%18.
Figure 2: TFR in European Countries since 1990 (US Census Bureau)
3 Data and Strategy of Estimation
Data come from the sample "Enquête Mode de Vie des Français" for the year 2007. It
consists in a sample of 3826 French agents aged between 18 and 93. The population is
constituted of 2080 women and 1746 men. Only women are considered in the present study.
The main reason lies in the fact that men and women do not experience the same pattern
18Europe is understood here as countries from the European Union in 2006. Data from Robert-Bobée
[2007] (INSEE)
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of fertility throughout their life. Women can only procreate during a limited period of time
while men are not biologically limited. Furthermore, the measurement of womens fertility
is less sensible to measurement errors. After having deleted missing observations, the sub
sample is reduced to 1799 observations. Notice that, for robustness checks, the data set will
be extended to men.
The sub samples total fertility rate equals 1,6 children. Among the 1793 women, 466 do
not have children while only 121 have more than three children. The average age is about
48. 219 women are less than 28 years old and 952 are more than 45 years old. 1500 have
been raised in a Catholic family while only 988 consider themselves as believers and 540
are considered as practicers19. Finally, 849 women from the selected sample are currently
married.
To measure the impact of religion, it is important to discriminate between the adherence
to a specic religion and the religiousness. In the present study, the religious a¢ liation of
agents is divided between major religions (Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, Jews...). It refers
to their response to the question: "In which religion have you been raised?". Their actual
faith is measured by their response to the question: "Are you a believer?".
As in Williams and Zimmer [1990], Adserá [2006] ; Amin et Al [1997], the degree of reli-
giousness is rst measured by attendance to religious o¢ ce. The variable "O¢ ce Frequency"
goes from zero to ve. It equals to one if he announces never going to religious o¢ ce and
ve if he goes to o¢ ce at least once a week. It increases with the respondents frequency of
attendance to o¢ ces. For robustness checks, another measure of religiousness is provided:
people were asked to evaluate the importance of religion in their own life from zero to ten.
The sample is not reduced to women who have completed their fertility as, for instance,
in Fernandez & Fogli [2007] and Breierova & Duo [2004]. This allows the sample size to
be larger and to extend the study to a higher number of generations. If religion has not
the same impact on all the generations of women, restraining the analysis to older woman
could lead to biased estimations. One could oppose that current and achieved fertility do
not describe the same phenomenon. However, during robustness checks, the sub sample of
women who have achieved their fertility is studied.
19An individual is considered as a Practicer if she declares frequently attending religious o¢ ces in addition
to religious festivities.
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As not all women in the sample have completed their fertility, it is obvious that the age
of the respondent has a strong inuence on her fertility. The older a woman, the higher her
fertility. This partly comes from the postponement of the rst birth. Furthermore, women
older than 45 are expected to have completed their reproduction process.
Directly introducing the age of the respondent sensibly increases the overall t of the
model. The e¤ect of age reects, however, much more complex phenomena than the simple
position of the respondent in her "reproductive process"20. Indeed, age also reects impor-
tant cohort e¤ects. During the second half of the twentieth century, France has experienced,
among other great transformations, a generalization of education, at least one profound
modication in family policies (1994), a strong decrease in the inuence of Catholicism,
a liberalization of the marriage market and a diversication of the forms of unions. The
standard deviation of age is about 16 years. A di¤erence of 16 years between two women
can explain their di¤erences in fertility because they are not in the same position in their
reproductive process but also because they have experienced di¤erences in the quality of
the education system, in family policies, in the prevalence of religious norms in the whole
society, etc.
Only the position in the reproductive process is used in the regressions. This is called
the "dummies strategy" where I control my results for less than 28 and more than 45 years
old. This makes the interpretation of the e¤ect of age easier. Notice that these dummies
also capture cohort e¤ects but these latter will be easier to identify. The results are also
provided when the age is directly introduced in the regressions (See Table 7). The impact
of proxies for cultural transmission inside the family and for religiosity are always validated.
Women from the entire sample are not necessarily married because, once again, reducing
the analysis to married women would induce the presence of a selection bias21. Indeed, doing
so, I would measure the impact of religion and cultural transmission among married French
women and not among French women. It can reasonably be expected that married woman
are not characterized by the same sensitivity toward religion and familial values than non
married women. I obviously control my results for the respondents situation on the marriage
20By assumption, a woman can be in one of the following situation: not fertile (less than 16 years old, not
usefull here), fertile but younger than the average age at rst birth (28 for France in 2006), fertile and older
than the average age at rst birth and in the "completed fertility position" (older than 45 by assumption).
21This choice is also made, for instance, by Young [2007] and Miranda [2008].
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market.
Family economics argue that females education and incomes play a major role in the
determination of optimal fertility. Two dummies are provided to control if the respondent
has only a primary education level or an university level. At least two variables have to
be considered to represent income: the female income and the male income. The dataset
contains informations on the respondents annual net income and on the total household
income. Then income of male can easily be inferred22. Notice that an endogeneity bias can
be suspected. Indeed, fertility and income can have common determinants which are not
taken into account in the present paper. For example, one can expect that subsidies for day
nurseries increase both fertility and incomes (higher labor force participation). This problem
will be investigated during robustness checks.
Fertility at the micro level consists in a count variable. Long & Freese [2006] under-
line that count data have to be analyzed with Poisson regressions or Negative Binomial
regressions in order to avoid any doubt of inconsistency and ine¢ ciency. Individual data on
fertility structurally exhibit a zero inated distribution. This characteristic comes from both
the postponement of rst birth in developed countries and the increase of childlessness since
the second World War. In France, the average age at rst birth was very close from 28 in
2006. The following regressions make it clear that the zero inated Poisson regression model
should be preferred to a simple Poisson regression model and to a zero inated negative
binomial regression model.
Several robustness checks are implemented. Their goal is to verify wether religion and
proxies for cultural transmission really have an impact on fertility. To do so, an alternative
measure of religiousness is provided. Furthermore, alternative samples are studied: women
being older than 45 and the entire population. This allows to suppress any doubts about the
e¤ect of sample selection on the relation between religion and fertility. To check robustness
for assumptions on the distribution, an ordered probit regression was run as in Fernandez &
Fogli [2007]. An OLS regression is also provided. All robustness checks indicate that religion
and transmission of values inside the family are relevant to explain fertility in France.
22Notice that, as in Fernandez & Fogli [2007], Melkerson & Rooth [2000], Miranda [2008], etc., reported
incomes are current incomes whereas endogenous fertility models deal with life cycle income. As in these
contributions, my results are controlled by education and age of the respondent in order to limit this weakness.
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4 Results
The assumption that fertility is distributed following a Poisson distribution would result in
the following probability of having yi = n children:
Pr [yi = n jxi] = e
 ini
n!
where i = exp (xi) with xi the individual characteristics: However, individual fertility data
often exhibit an excess of zero observations. So in order to take into account the high number
of zero in the data set, a Zero Inated Poisson (ZIP) regression model is proposed23. This
method allows to explain both the number of children born (with a Poisson model) and the
decision not to have children (with a Logit model).
The probability (i) for an individual to belong to the group exhibiting a zero count (G
0)
is represented by a Logit model:
i =
eizi
1 + eizi
where zi are the variables explaining the decision to have children and i the estimated
parameters. If an individual belongs to the zero group (G0 = 1), her estimated fertility is
always zero. If she does not belong to the zero group (G0 = 0, with probability 1  i), her
fertility is assumed to be distributed following a Poisson distribution. Then, her probability
to have n  0 children equals Pr [yi = n jxi] = e
 ini
n!
: Finally, the assumed distribution for
count fertility is sensibly di¤erent from the Poisson regression model. Indeed, the overall
probability for a zero count is:
Pr [yi = 0 jxi; zi] = i + (1  i) Pr[yi = 0 jxi; G0 = 1]
And the probability for a positive count is:
Pr [yi = n > 0 jxi; zi] = (1  i) Pr[yi = n > 0 jxi; G0 = 0]
Obviously, this modied Poisson distribution increases the probability to have a zero
count compared to a standard Poisson regression model. As the Poisson regression model
23Long & Freese [2006] provide a very simple and enlightening presentation of the method to obtain the
zero inated Poisson regression model.
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and the zero inated regression model are not nested, to determine if the distribution really
exhibits an excess of zeros, a Vuong test [1989] is run. The Vuong statistics24 indicate that
the Zero inated Poisson regression model should be preferred to the Poisson regression
model.
In order to clearly determine the impact of religion and cultural transmission, a step
by step zero inated Poisson regression model is implemented (see Table 1). In a rst
regression (Model 1), neither religious nor cultural variables are considered. In a second
regression (Model 2), the variables describing the cultural transmission from parents to
children are introduced. These variables describe the parental fertility of the respondent
and the transmission of family oriented values into the family. In Model 3, I introduce the
variable "No Religion" describing if the respondent has been raised in a religious family25. In
Model 4, the variable "Believer" is added. It equals one if the individual answers "Yes" to the
question: "Are you a Believer?". The variable "O¢ ce Frequency" measures the respondents
religiousness. It increases from 1 to 6 in function of the his attendance to religious o¢ ces in
Model 5.
In the present sample, the high number of zero counts is explained by the respondents
age, the size of her town and her "higher education status". The older a woman is, the
lower her probability to have no child. Furthermore, a woman who has engaged in higher
education and does not live in a small town has a smaller probability to choose not having
children. Finally, the excess of zero reects both the strong postponement of rst birth in
developed economies (women tend to have their children after 28) and the fact that urban
highly educated women more often choose not having children than other woman.
Alternative regressions for the excess of zero have been tested (see Table 3 in appendix).
I nd that never having been married has no impact on the decision to not have children.
This result conrms that limiting the study to married woman could bias the estimation of
the impact of cultural background on fertility. Religiousness and to have only low education
levels have no signicant impact on the probability to be childless.
As shown in Model 2, to have been raised in larger families signicantly increases the
24Vuong statistics are reported in Table 1.
25It takes value one if the respondent has been raised in a religion. Notice that the sample su¤ers from a
selection bias in the sense that other non catholic religions are under represented. Then di¤erences between
religious cannot be investigated.
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respondents fertility. Furthermore, the transmission of family oriented values among gener-
ations also increases fertility.
Another major result lies in the fact that having been raised in a religious family and
proclaiming to be a religious believer do not signicantly increase expected fertility26 (see
Table 1). Indeed, in model 4 (Table 1), the variable Believer was, a priori, signicant
because, putting alone, it brings out two dimensions of the religious background: believing
and practicing (religiousness). This is conrmed when religiosity is added in the regressions
(see model 5). Finally, religiousness measured by the frequency of o¢ ces attendance is the
only religious variable which signicantly inuences fertility.
Following these results, Model 6 indicates that an increase of one standard deviation in
the O¢ ce Frequency increases the estimated fertility of the respondent by a factor of 1.044.
In other word, the estimated fertility of a woman with the maximal religiousness is 24%
higher than the expected fertility of a woman without any religiousness. It has to be noticed
that the introduction of religious variables does not weaken the impact of proxies for the
transmission of fertility patterns and family oriented values inside the family.
The Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) indicates that Model 6 is very strongly pre-
ferred to Model 5. This conrms that both having been raised in a specic religion and being
a believer are meaningless to explain fertility behaviors. Following Raftery [1996], the BIC
indicates a positive evidence in favor of Model 6 against Model 1 but not a strong evidence.
As Model 1 and 6 are nested, a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test can be run. It appears that
Model 6 should be strongly preferred to Model 127.
Usual predictions of Family economics are also validated. Income of men and women have
opposite e¤ects. The income of the woman has a negative impact on her fertility whereas the
income of the man has a positive impact. This tends to conrm that opportunity costs of
fertility are essentially determined by the womans income. This interpretation is conditional
on the assumption that mothers have to invest a higher part of their time in child rearing.
In line with the results of Ahn & Mira [2002], this e¤ect is expected to be smaller in France
26The sample su¤ers from a selection bias in the sense that alternative religions are under represented in
the sample. Then specic religious a¢ liation cannot be tested as a determinant of fertility.
27The null-hypothesis is that the coe¢ cient of O¢ ce Fraquency, Parental Fertility and family Values are
all equal to zero. The probability to prefer model 6 against model 1 while model 1 ts better the distribution
than model 6 equals to 0,0002.
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than in some other European countries like Germany, Greece and Italy. Indeed, the French
infrastructures and scal scheme allow women to conciliate a strong participation to the
labor market and high fertility.
The impact of school attainment has a signicant impact on expected fertility only for less
educated women. Indeed, the expected fertility of a woman who has only achieved primary
education is 19,1% higher than a woman who has achieved a high school graduation. Women
with an university level have a stronger probability not having children but, when they decide
having children, their fertility behavior is not signicantly di¤erent from women who only
have a high school diploma.
Finally, women younger than 28 exhibit a lower fertility than others. Indeed, in 2006, the
average age of entry in fertility for French woman was 28. Furthermore, women older than
45 are expected to have achieved their reproduction process. In consequence, they mechan-
ically tend to have more children than women who have not yet achieved their reproductive
process. Notice that, as mentioned in the preceding section, this e¤ects are also suspected
to derive from some cohort e¤ects28. However, the fact that the e¤ects of the position in the
reproductive process are in adequacy with intuition, indicates that the cohort e¤ects are not
too strong.
The following section provides some robustness checks. It checks that the signicant role
of the cultural background in the Poisson regression model does not come neither from the
assumptions on the distribution nor from the chosen measure of religiousness.
5 Robustness Checks
The following subsections test the robustness of my results with regard to assumptions on
the distribution, endogeneity of the female income, the measure of religiousness and the
sample selection.
28Particularly, the generous family policies implemented in France since 1994 have sensibly increased
fertility. This could have altered the impact of the variable "More Than 45 yo" because the group of women
being older than 45 embodies the group of women who achieved their reproductive process without enjoying
generous subsidies for fertility.
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5.1 Overdispersion and Alternative distributions
This subsection provides robustness checks for the distribution. The estimation of count
data with a Poisson or Zero Inated Poisson regression model can be subject to overdis-
persion. Looking at the summary values, it appears that the samples variance (1,762) is
greater than its mean (1,582). To test for overdispersion29, a zero inated Negative Binomial
regression model is provided. The negative binomial regression model allows the variance
of the distribution to be greater than its mean: V (y jxi) = E(y jxi): An LR test for the
assumption  = 0 is proposed. The probability of rejecting  = 0 when this is true equals to
0,938. As the data set is not subjected to overdispersion, the zero inated Poisson regression
model should be preferred30.
Fernandez & Fogli [2007] analyze fertility data at the micro level using ordered probit
regressions. I also use this method to test the impact of cultural background on fertility
in addition to Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) regressions31. The ordered probit regression
model (Table II) also indicates that having been raised in a religious family and being a
believer have no impact on fertility. LR test for nested model and di¤erences in BIC indicate
that the model which includes the religiousness variable (o¢ ce frequency), the parental
fertility and the Family Value variable is preferred to the two other ordered probit models.
Expected di¤erential fertility between woman with the maximal religiousness and women
without religiousness is about 20%.
In Table II, OLS regressions also conclude that the model which excludes the variables
No Religion and Believer should be preferred to other OLS models. The OLS regressions
provide results which are closed to the zero inated Poisson regression model and the ordered
probit model.
These regressions conrm that the signicance of the relation between religion, cultural
transmission and fertility, is not dependent on my assumption on the distribution.
29In case of overdispersion, the standard errors in the PRM will be biased downward, resulting in spuriously
large z-values and spuriously small p-values (Cameron and Trivedi [1986]).
30Because  = 0 with a very strong p-value, regressions are not reported. Indeed, values of estimated
parameters are indentical in the two regressions. Their only di¤erences lie in the z-statistic for the ination
term which are smaller in the zero inated negative binomial regression model than in the zero inated
poisson regression model. Nevertheless, signicance of each variable remains unchanged.
31Long & Freese [2006] underline that count data can sometimes be analyzed with OLS regression.
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5.2 Endogeneity Bias and Instruments for Female Income
The Beckerian models of fertility show that fertility and income nd common determinants
like the cost of the quantity of children which determine both the female fertility and her
participation to the labor market. If the female income is endogenous, it would be correlated
with errors and result in some inconsistency. In this subsection, I propose to investigate this
question in the framework of OLS models. As previously shown, OLS regressions provide
satisfying results in comparison to zero inated poisson and probit models. Dealing with
OLS allows to apply simple methods to address endogeneity.
I rst perform a Durbin-Hausman-Wu test of endogeneity32 for the female income which
shows that the female income is endogenous. Indeed, the Durbin-Hausman-Wu statistics
indicate that the probability to accept exogeneity of the female income while it is endogenous
in reality, equals 37,6%. Following this result, I propose to instrument the womens income
by the variables "Financial Expert" and "Bank Loan"33.
The variable "Financial Expert" comes from the answer to the following question: "When
you have to make a nancial investment, do you consult a Financial Expert?" Respondents
has the choice between three answers: "Often", "Sometimes" or "Never"34. One can reason-
ably expect that the answer to this question is negative correlated with income because it
is relied on the frequency and amounts of savings but not with fertility. Indeed, consulting
nancial expert tells nothing about the risk aversion of the respondent. So it is not suspected
to be related to prudency or risk taking which could be, however, related to fertility.
The variable "Bank Loan" comes from the response to the following question: "If you
needed money, do you expect that you could borrow it to a bank?" As for "Financial Ex-
pertise", the expectation about bank loan is suspected to be correlated with income but not
with the fertility choice35.
32This test simply was was rst proposed by Durbin [1954] and separately by Wu [1973] and Hausman
[1978].
33I choose to use two instruments rather than only one because it allows run Sargan and Di¤erence in
Sargan tests for the exogeneity of instruments. Indeed, the Di¤erence in Sargan test (Hansen Sargan test)
is a test of overidentifying restrictions (see Wooldridge [2000]).
34The variable "Financial Expert" equals to one if the respondent chooses "Often", to two if he chooses
"Sometimes" and to three if "Never". Then "Financial Expert" is expected to negatively impact the income.
35The variable "Bank Loan" equals one if the answer is "No" and zero if "Yes". Then "Bank Loan" is
expected to be negatively correlated to the respondents income.
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Regressions are provided in Table 4 in appendix. As expected, the variables "Financial
Expertise" and "Bank Loan" both have a negative and signicant impact on income (see
"female income regression" in Table 4). Furthermore, after its instrumentation, female
income still has a signicant negative impact on expected fertility while male income has
a positive one. Notice that coe¢ cients of "Primary Education" and "Parental Fertility"
and "O¢ ce Frequency" still have the same sign but are now smaller. Furthermore "O¢ ce
Frequency" is now signicant at the 5% condence level and "Primary Education" and
"Parental Fertility" at the 10% one. I provide Sargan and Di¤erence in Sargan statistics to
test the exogeneity of my instruments. These tests conclude that these latters are satisfying
at the 5% condence level (see Table 4).
Finally, in the OLS framework, there exist an endogeneity bias for female income. After
a correction for this bias, the e¤ects I determined in the precedent section remain robust36.
5.3 An alternative Measure of Religiousness
The data set provides an alternative measure of the respondents religiousness. It consists
in the answer to the question "Between 0 and 10, how do you evaluate the importance of
religion in your own life?". This variable is subject to some caveats. Indeed, it consists
in a subjective variable while the frequency of church attendance is an objective criterion.
Two respondents can have the same religious behavior but di¤erent subjective estimates
of the importance of religion. An absolute notation makes interpretations harder because
di¤erences in evaluations are less objective than di¤erences in church attendance. To weaken
this limitation, a variable "Estimated Religiousness" is constructed. It equals: (i) 1 if the
respondents answer belongs to [0,3], (ii) 2 if his answer belongs to [4,6] and (iii) 3 if it
belongs to [7,10].
The variable "O¢ ce Frequency" has been replaced by the variable "Estimated Religious-
ness" in the zero inated Poisson regression model and in the ordered probit regression
model (see Table 5 in appendix). In the zero inated Poisson regression model, "Estimated
Religiousness" has a signicant positive impact on fertility when the variables "No Religion"
and "Believer" are not taken into account. An LR test between the model with "Estimated
36Ideally, this method should be applied to the poisson regression model. However, it is confronted to a
problem of convergence of the estimators.
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Religiousness" and without it, indicates that the rst model is preferred at the 5 percent
level. The di¤erences in BIC are not conclusive. The expected di¤erential fertility between
an agent who strongly care about religion (Estimated Religiousness = 3) and an agent who
does not care about religion (Estimated Religiousness = 1) equals to 10,2%. The same kind
of results are found with the ordered probit regressions where BIC di¤erences indicates a
strong preferences for the model which includes religiousness. Notice that, once again, the
impact of the transmission of values into the family, is robust to the introduction of religious
variables.
It appears that studying the impact of religion with the variable "Strong Religiosity"
is less conclusive than with the Church attendance. This is probably due to the inherent
imperfections of this measure. However, whatever the chosen measure and the estimation
strategy, exhibiting a strong religiousness always increases fertility, at least at the 5 percent
level of condence.
5.4 Alternative Samples
As mentioned in section 4, all women of the sample have not yet achieved their reproductive
process at the moment of the study. This could imply some doubts about what is really
measured. Indeed, the fertility of a woman older than 45 years old can be considered as a
completed fertility while the fertility of a younger woman can be considered as a current
fertility. Model 2 of the preceding section was run on the subsample of women who achieved
their reproductive process37. Intuitively, the distribution is less suspected to exhibit an
excess of zero observations since this was greatly explained by the age of the respondent.
Indeed, the Vuong test indicates that the Poisson regression model is preferred to the zero
inated Poisson regression model38. An ordered Probit regression model is also provided
(see Table 6 in appendix).
In both models, strong religiousness still increases the expected fertility of the respondent.
For example, as in the preceding section, the fertility di¤erential between strong practicers
(O¢ ce Frequency = 6) and agents who do not practice at all, is about 16%.
37This reduces the samples size to only 943 observations. The reduction of the sample to women who
have completed their fertility has been used, among others, by Melkersson & Rooth [2000] and Covas & Silva
[2000].
38The Vuong Statistic equals 0.83.
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As mentioned in the discussion about the strategy of estimation, the e¤ect of age is
di¢ cult to interpret when it is directly added in the regression. Nevertheless, a zero inated
regression model where the age of the respondent directly enters the determinants of the non
zero counts in place of the age dummies, was run (see Table 7). The impact of age on expected
fertility is obviously positive and signicant. However, the impact of religiousness is smaller
than for the entire sample and is signicant only at the 5% condence level. The impact of
females education is no more signicant. This result seems to conrm that directly adding
the age variable in the regression captures important e¤ects that are independent from the
simple position of the woman in her process of fertility. Indeed, it seems to capture, at least,
the recent evolution of school enrollment. Despite this limitation, the e¤ect of religiousness
is also validated.
Finally, as in Braenas-Garza & Neuman [2006], the zero inated Poisson regression model
is also provided for the entire sample including men and women (Table 6). A dummy
"Female" is introduced, it has a positive and signicant impact on fertility. On the whole
population, the variable "O¢ ce Frequency" is strongly signicant but exhibits a smaller value
than for the womens subsample: maximal di¤erential fertility between strong religiousness
and no religiousness equals 18,2%.
6 Conclusion
Studies of the French fertility at the micro level have always been truncated of their religious
dimension. Indeed, the French law makes it very di¢ cult to collect individual data on reli-
gious a¢ liation. The data set "Enquête Mode de Vie des Francais" allows, for the rst time,
to analyze the impact of religion on fertility in France. Furthermore, it provides complemen-
tary proxies for cultural transmission into the family: the fertility of the respondents parent
and the transmission of "Family Oriented Values". It appears that having been raised in a
religious family has no signicant e¤ect on fertility and considering oneself as a believer does
not matter either. Religiousness, whatever the measure chosen, has always a positive and
signicant impact on expected fertility. A woman who has a strong religiousness has an 24
percent higher expected fertility than a woman without religiousness at all.
The present paper also validates usual predictions of family economics. The income of
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men has a positive impact on womans fertility while the womens own income has a negative
impact on her fertility. Moreover, the womens school attainment has a negative impact on
their expected number of children.
Because the sample su¤ers from an under representation of Muslims, Jews and Protestants,
the religious a¢ liation could not be properly investigate. Moreover, the ethnic origin of the
respondent is not available in the data set. Future works should aim at building a specic
data set dedicated to the study of fertility behaviors in France where religious and ethnic
informations would be collected. This would allow to make more precise measurement of
fertility behaviors and of the impact of culture on it, culture encompassing a richer set of
dimensions.
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Table 1: Zero Inated Poisson Regression Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Female Income -0.056 -0.052 -0.052 -0.050 -0.051 -0.051
(4.28)*** (3.90)*** (3.92)*** (3.81)*** (3.83)*** (3.85)***
Male Income 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029 0.028
(3.61)*** (3.35)*** (3.39)*** (3.39)*** (3.46)*** (3.39)***
Small Town 0.127 0.128 0.129 0.129 0.125 0.123
(3.14)*** (3.14)*** (3.17)*** (3.17)*** (3.08)*** (3.03)***
Live In Paris -0.263 -0.242 -0.245 -0.246 -0.246 -0.241
(4.34)*** (3.96)*** (4.00)*** (4.03)*** (4.03)*** (3.95)***
Primary Education 0.214 0.201 0.203 0.200 0.202 0.200
(3.50)*** (3.28)*** (3.32)*** (3.25)*** (3.29)*** (3.27)***
Higher Education -0.073 -0.06 -0.061 -0.062 -0.068 -0.067
(1.55) (1.27) (1.28) (1.30) (1.43) (1.41)
Never Married -1.246 -1.242 -1.243 -1.234 -1.237 -1.239
(13.03)*** (13.00)*** (13.00)*** (12.90)*** (12.92)*** (12.96)***
More Than 45 0.145 0.138 0.144 0.138 0.132 0.125
(3.40)*** (3.24)*** (3.32)*** (3.19)*** (3.05)*** (2.91)***
Less Than 28 -0.724 -0.731 -0.740 -0.754 -0.756 -0.736
(3.58)*** (3.50)*** (3.49)*** (3.43)*** (3.37)*** (3.42)***
Parental Fertility 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.033
(2.36)** (2.37)** (2.37)** (2.35)** (2.33)**
Family Values 0.079 0.080 0.077 0.075 0.075
(3.18)*** (3.22)*** (3.09)*** (3.04)*** (3.02)***
No Religion 0.047 0.079 0.090
(0.79) (1.27) (1.43)
Believer 0.070 0.025
(1.72)* (0.53)
O¢ ce Frequency 0.032 0.032
(1.98)** (2.72)***
Constant 0.501 0.312 0.299 0.256 0.197 0.234
(6.91)*** (3.26)*** (3.08)*** (2.56)** (1.88)* (2.30)**
Logit
Age -0.593 -0.630 -0.642 -0.664 -0.680 -0.648
(5.43)*** (5.38)*** (5.36)*** (5.35)*** (5.33)*** (5.37)***
Higher Education 1.509 1.543 1.546 1.538 1.571 1.567
(2.09)** (2.09)** (2.09)** (2.07)** (2.09)** (2.11)**
Small Town -1.349 -1.383 1.383 -1.39 -1.38 -1.38
(2.24)** (2.27)** (2.26)** (2.27)** (2.09)** (2.26)**
Constant 13.684 14.454 14.695 15.145 15.494 14.820
(3.34)*** (2.83)*** (2.66)*** (2.34)** (2.21)** (2.59)***
Pseudo R 0,134 0,137 0,137 0,137 0,138 0,138
BIC -8362 -8363 -8359 -8354 -8351 -8366
Vuong Statistic (3.82)*** (3.80)*** (3.80)*** (3.76)*** (3.74)*** (3.76)***
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5 %; * signicant at 1 %
Absolute value of z stat in parentheses
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Table 3: Alternative Assumptions for the Zero Ination
Selected Model Extended Model Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3
Female Income -0.051 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050 -0.050
(3.85)*** (3.76)*** (3.76)*** (3.77)*** (3.76)***
Male Income 0.028 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027
(3.39)*** (3.25)*** (3.25)*** (3.25)*** (3.25)***
Small Town 0.123 0.110 0.110 0.110 0.109
(3.03)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)*** (2.68)*** (2.67)***
Live In Paris -0.241 -0.231 -0.231 -0.231 -0.231
(3.95)*** (3.75)*** (3.75)*** (3.76)*** (3.75)***
Primary Education 0.200 0.201 0.201 0.201 0.201
(3.27)*** (3.28)*** (3.28)*** (3.28)*** (3.29)***
Never Married -1.239 -1.235 -1.237 -1.236 -1.237
(12.96)*** (12.27)*** (12.89)*** (12.30)*** (12.29)***
More Than 45 0.125 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.113
(2.91)*** (2.62)*** (2.62)*** (2.63)*** (2.62)***
Less Than 28 -0.736 -0.564 -0.565 -0.567 -0.558
(3.42)*** (3.15)*** (3.18)*** (3.18)*** (3.12)***
Parental Fertility 0.033 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032
(2.33)** (2.26)** (2.26)** (2.26)** (2.25)**
Family Values 0.075 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.075
(3.02)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (3.06)*** (2.98)***
O¢ ce Frequency 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.031 0.031
(2.72)*** (2.70)*** (2.70)*** (2.69)*** (2.68)***
Constant 0.234 0.257 0.257 0.258 0.260
(2.30)** (2.53)** (2.53)** (2.53)** (2.55)**
Logit
Age -0.648 -0.518 -0.521 -0.519 -0.518
(5.42)** (5.47)*** (5.76)*** (5.40)*** (5.39)***
O¢ ce Frequency -0.07 -0.08
(0.22) (0.28)
Small Town -1.651 -1.637 -1.631 -1.686
(2.48)** (2.56)** (2.47)** (2.52)**
Primary Education -2.92
(0.00)
Higher Education 1.567 1.57 1.541 1.612 1.557
(2.11)** (2.09)** (2.09)** (2.11)** (2.12)**
Small Town -1.38 -1.38 -1.38 -1.342 -1.414
(2.26)** (2.19)** (2.26)** (2.15)** (2.29)**
Family Values -0,123
(0.33) (0.37)
Never Married -0.24 -0.26
(0.29) (0.31)
Constant 14.820 13.060 13.134 13.122 13.093
(5.37)*** (5.37)*** (5.71)*** (5.33)*** (5.30)***
Pseudo R 0,137 0,139 0,139 0,139 0,139
BIC -8366 -8339 -8354 -8354 -8355
Observations 1793, * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5 %; * signicant at 1 %
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables for Female Income
qb1 Female Income Regression
Female Income -0.47
(3.04)***
Male Income 0.141 0.207
(3.81)*** (14.07)***
Less Than 28 -1.353 -0.961
(7.31)*** (7.93)***
More Than 45 0.319 0.334
(3.66)*** (4.16)***
Small Town 0.145 -0.199
(2.01)** (2.59)**
Live In Paris -0.125 0.455
(1.19) (4.70)***
Primary Education 0.213 -0.445
(1.74)* (3.19)***
Never Married -0.954 0.241
(10.71)*** (2.51)**
Parental Fertility 0.032 -0.025
(1.78)* (0.96)
Family Values 0.087 -0.123
(1.98)** (2.68)***
O¢ ce Frequency 0.166 -0.036
(2.37)** (0.44)
Financial Expert -0.133
(2.69)***
Bank Loan -0.550
(4.57)***
Constant 1.85 2.350
(7.24)*** (9.42)***
Sargan Statistic (all instruments) 7.68
(0.007)
C-Statistic for qf18 7.68
(0.007)
Adj R 0.1404 0.303
Di¤erence in Sargan (7.49)***
Sargan Statistic (7.49)***
Durbin - Hausman - Wu test -0.48
(coe¢ cient for residuals) (3.42)***
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table 5: Alternative Measure of Religiousness
ZIP 1 ZIP 2 ZIP 3 Oprobit 1 Oprobit 2 Oprobit 3
Female Income -0.050 -0.050 -0.055 -0.080 -0.080 -0.087
(3.79)*** (3.79)*** (4.17)*** (4.35)*** (4.34)*** (4.79)***
Male Income 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.052 0.051 0.052
(3.53)*** (3.45)*** (3.62)*** (4.43)*** (4.31)*** (4.51)***
Less Than 28 -0.750 -0.734 -0.729 -1.410 -1.401 -1.419
(3.45)*** (3.48)*** (3.57)*** (12.07)*** (12.02)*** (12.21)***
More Than 45 0.133 0.126 0.148 0.207 0.196 0.230
(3.06)*** (2.91)*** (3.45)*** (3.48)*** (3.32)*** (3.95)***
Small Town 0.134 0.132 0.131 0.258 0.256 0.253
(3.27)*** (3.23)*** (3.21)*** (4.47)*** (4.43)*** (4.38)***
Live In Paris -0.244 -0.239 -0.260 -0.349 -0.342 -0.371
(3.98)*** (3.91)*** (4.27)*** (4.56)*** (4.47)*** (4.88)***
Primary Education 0.174 0.171 0.192 0.288 0.285 0.317
(2.78)*** (2.75)*** (3.09)*** (2.91)*** (2.87)*** (3.21)***
Never Married -1.251 -1.252 -1.261 -1.372 -1.371 -1.369
(12.92)*** (12.95)*** (13.04)*** (15.97)*** (16.01)*** (16.02)***
Parental Fertility 0.030 0.030 0.057 0.057
(2.10)** (2.08)** (2.83)*** (2.84)***
Family Values 0.079 0.078 0.146 0.143
(3.14)*** (3.11)*** (4.15)*** (4.08)***
No Religion 0.087 0.143
(1.39) (1.75)*
Believer 0.010 0.007
(0.20) (0.10)
Estimated Religiousness 0.059 0.056 0.094 0.083
(1.94)* (2.29)** (2.18)** (2.40)**
Constant 0.193 0.228 0.494
(1.81)* (2.19)** (6.78)***
Pseudo R 0.138 0.138 0.134 0.151 0.15 0.145
BIC -8257 -8270 -8268 -8379 -8391 -8381
Observations 1774, Results for Logit Deleted
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
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Table 7: Alternative Methods for Age
Age in the Regression Dummies Strategy
Female Income -0.052 -0.050
(3.93)*** (3.81)***
Male Income 0.035 0.029
(4.14)*** (3.47)***
Age 0.008
(5.58)***
Small Town 0.134 0.131
(3.26)*** (3.21)***
Live In Paris -0.239 -0.240
(3.90)*** (3.92)***
Primary Education 0.106 0.174
(1.64) (2.79)***
Never Married -1.239 -1.255
(12.70)*** (12.98)***
Parental Fertility 0.037 0.031
(2.59)*** (2.13)**
Family Values 0.080 0.077
(3.20)*** (3.09)***
O¢ ce Frequency 0.084 0.115
(1.98)** (2.74)***
More Than 45 0.124
(2.87)***
Less Than 28 -0.749
(3.45)***
Constant -0.110 0.239
(0.87) (2.34)**
Pseudo R 0,139 0,139
BIC -8277 -8272
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%
Results for Logit Deleted
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